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The Forgotten Right: Section 9 of the
Charter, Its Purpose and Meaning
James Stribopoulos

I. INTRODUCTION
Ask anyone familiar with criminal procedure in Canada to name a
seminal judgment on section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1 (“the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure”),
and most will undoubtedly respond Hunter v. Southam.2 Alternatively,
some might suggest R. v. Collins.3 Either way, virtually everyone you
ask will have little difficulty identifying at least one, and probably more,
important Supreme Court of Canada decisions on section 8. Ask that
same question about section 9 (“the right not to be arbitrarily detained or
imprisoned”) and compare the results. Chances are most people you ask
will struggle to name a single Supreme Court judgment involving section 9,
let alone identify a standout.
Unlike section 8 of the Charter, there is no ready parallel to section
9 found in the U.S. Bill of Rights.4 Given an abundance of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence relating to search and seizure,5 the Supreme

Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School (jstribopoulos@osgoode.yorku.ca). An
earlier draft of this paper was presented at The National Conference on the Charter and Criminal
Justice in Toronto, September 2007. The paper benefited from discussions I had with my co-panellists
leading up to and at the conference, Professor Stephen Coughlan, Justice Maureen Forestell, and
Justice Casey Hill. A debt of gratitude is also owed to Maija Martin, my very capable research
assistant. Of course, any errors are mine alone.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”).
3
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
4
U.S. Const. amend. I-X.
5
U.S. Const. amend. IV (“Fourth Amendment”). The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In the United States the Fourth Amendment has also been the basis for judicial efforts to
constitutionally regulate stops and arrests. In particular, the language that confers the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” extends constitutional
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Court of Canada was provided with a crystal ball with which to forecast
the implications of taking a variety of different paths under section 8.
With the benefit of the American experience the Court acted quickly to
identify the protection of reasonable privacy expectations as the sine qua
non of that constitutional guarantee.6 Soon after, the Court set down an
analytical framework for the adjudication of constitutional claims under
section 8.7 The result was that early in the Charter’s history the stage
was set for a very constructive dialogue between the Court and Parliament
on the subject of police search and seizure powers.8
The Supreme Court has dealt with section 9 of the Charter on a
number of occasions over the past 25 years. Nevertheless, its jurisprudence
involving the guarantee has been marked by extraordinary restraint.
Although the Court has supplied some guidance on when a law authorizing
detention or imprisonment will run afoul of section 9, it has steered
clear of explaining the larger purpose of the section or addressing in any
meaningful way the far more common question: when should an individual
police officer’s decision to detain or arrest be characterized as having been
made “arbitrarily”?
Not surprisingly, uncertainty about the purpose and meaning of
section 9 has had significant negative consequences. Absent a theoretical
framework to guide developments in this important area, many cases are
marked by a pronounced reluctance to characterize anything but the
most coercive encounters as resulting in a “detention”. By refraining
from finding a “detention”, courts avoid the need to grapple with the
equally thorny question of whether an encounter between an individual
and the police runs afoul of the Charter guarantee because it took place
“arbitrarily”.
protection to so-called “seizures of the person”, i.e. stops and arrests. Arrests have been held to
require probable cause to justify them (see, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 at 103 (1959)),
whereas investigative stops simply require reasonable suspicion (see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
at 23-24, 27, 30, 32-33 (1968)).
6
See Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159 (S.C.C.)
wherein the Supreme Court of Canada relied upon the seminal decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
on the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7
In R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.), the Supreme
Court explained that a “search will be reasonable if it is authorized by law, if the law itself is
reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried out is reasonable”. See also R. v.
Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at 22 (S.C.C.).
8
On the dialogue that emerged with respect to search and seizure, albeit briefly, see generally
James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter”
(2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 61-73. See also Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism
or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 176-79; and Kent Roach, “American
Constitutional Theory for Canadians (and the Rest of the World)” (2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 503, at 518-23.
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The other unfortunate development that is very likely connected to a
stagnant section 9 jurisprudence is the rise of judicially created detention
powers. During the same period that legislative reform was resulting in
more clearly defined search and seizure powers, the law relating to police
detention practices became steeped in increased confusion. Without robust
section 9 jurisprudence, Parliament was not provided with any real
incentive to redress substantial gaps in the formal detention powers
possessed by police. Unlike with search and seizure, a dialogue between
the courts and Parliament never took place on the subject of police
detention powers.
In the absence of legislative intervention, however, the courts came
under increased pressure to make up for considerable shortcomings in
the lawful authority possessed by police to carry out detentions. The
Supreme Court responded to that pressure by transforming an obscure
English precedent into a device for the judicial recognition of new
“ancillary” police powers at “common law”.9 Initially, this allowed a
slim majority of the Supreme Court to recognize a power on the part of
police to carry out roadblock stops to check on driver sobriety. 10 This
was eventually followed by a police power to detain for investigative
purposes11 and, most recently, just this past year, a power to conduct
roadblock stops to further criminal investigative ends.12

9

In R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court
relied on a two-part test developed by the English Court of Criminal Appeal for a rather different
purpose. See R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.), which recognized a
two-part test which was intended to be used for determining whether a police officer, whom the
accused in that case were charged with obstructing, was acting “in the execution of his duty” — an
essential ingredient of the offence charged in that case. The transformation of that test by the
Supreme Court of Canada into means by which to recognize new police powers has met with
considerable criticism. See Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005] Crim. L.
Rev. 98, at 103-107; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson”
(2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935, at 939; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention:
Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335, at 348-52; James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue:
The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 18-30.
10
R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.).
11
This power was first recognized in R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d)
482 (Ont. C.A.). Virtually every appellate court in the country then followed that judgment before
the Supreme Court of Canada finally endorsed the investigative detention power. See R. v. Mann,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.). For a critical evaluation of Mann based, in part,
on the uncertainty that it has served to create, see James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially
Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention After Mann” (2007) 45 Crim. L.Q. 299. For a
consideration of the many gaps left by the judgment along with suggestions as to how to fill them,
see Michal Fairburn, “Mann Oh Man — We’ve Only Just Begun” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 171.
12
See R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
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While the Supreme Court has been busy creating new legal powers
by which to justify state interferences with individual liberty, it has said
virtually nothing about the purpose behind section 9. Similarly, the
Supreme Court has been noticeably coy on the question of what
constitutional implications might flow should the authorities fail to abide
by the rather uncertain limits the Court has articulated with respect to
the “common law” detention powers that it has recently created.
This paper will attempt to do what the jurisprudence has so far
managed to avoid: identify both the purpose and meaning of section 9
of the Charter. This is an essential first step in any effort to achieve
meaningful constitutional protection for what is arguably the most
fundamental right of all: individual liberty.
By drawing on a variety of sources, Part II will attempt to reveal the
purpose and meaning of section 9 of the Charter. Part III will revisit the
key threshold requirement for triggering the guarantee: a “detention”.
An “imprisonment” can also engage the provision, but as will be explained
below, its meaning is far from controversial.13 Case law interpreting and
applying the “detention” requirement will be closely scrutinized in an
effort to evaluate how well the jurisprudence coincides with the purpose
of the guarantee.

II. THE PURPOSE AND MEANING OF SECTION 914
Section 9 of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right not to
be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.” Over the last 25 years the Supreme
Court of Canada has never expressly taken up the challenge of identifying
the purpose of the guarantee or supplying anything more than a partial
sense of its potential meaning. The Court’s rather restrained approach
toward section 9 is apparent in even the most superficial quantitative
analysis of its cases involving the guarantee.
Section 9 has been raised before the Supreme Court in 24 separate
cases.15 In eight of these the Court resolved the case on some other bases
13

See Part III, The Effect of Reading “Detention” Purposively.
This part of the paper expands on ideas first explored elsewhere. See James Stribopoulos,
“Unchecked Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 225,
at 264-73.
15
I include in this category those cases in which a litigant relied on s. 9 in advancing the
merits of their position on appeal or where the Court addressed the guarantee in any substantive
way. See R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (challenging the use of
an investigative roadblock by police); Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007]
S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) (challenging the security certificate scheme); R. v. Chaisson,
14
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and thereby avoided any meaningful consideration of section 9.16 Of the

[2006] S.C.J. No. 11, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 415 (S.C.C.) (restoring an acquittal ordered by the trial judge
who found a violation of ss. 8, 9 and 10(b)); R. v. Decorte, [2004] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133
(S.C.C.) (challenging the RIDE program carried out on a Native reserve); R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J.
No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.) (noting that investigative detentions carried out in accordance with
the common law power recognized in this case would not violate s. 9); R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J.
No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) (challenging the appellant’s arrest); R. v. Jacques, [1996]
S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312 (S.C.C.) (challenging the detention of the appellant to
investigate suspected smuggling); R. v. Montour, [1995] S.C.J. No. 48, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 416 (S.C.C.)
(a one-paragraph judgment restoring the appellant’s acquittal at trial following the exclusion of evidence
as a result of a s. 9 violation); R. v. Simpson, [1995] S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.)
(challenging the reversal of a stay ordered at trial due to a delay in bringing the appellant to court
for a bail hearing, s. 9 violation conceded — the only issue was the appropriateness of a stay); R. v.
Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (challenging the offence of vagrancy
by loitering near playgrounds); R. v. Macooh, [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.)
(challenging the appellant’s detention and arrest); R. v. Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992]
3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (challenging the public safety and public interest bases for denying bail); R. v.
Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.) (challenging a search that took
place incidental to a RIDE stop); R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.)
(challenging the reversal of the burden on bail hearings for drug offences); R. v. Swain, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) (challenging the automatic committal to custody of
those found not guilty by reason of insanity); R. v. Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1291 (S.C.C.) (challenging a vehicle stop); R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257
(S.C.C.) (challenging the constitutionality of roving and random stops under the authority of
s. 189(a)(1) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198); R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J.
No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (challenging the mandatory minimum sentence for murder);
R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) (challenging the delay in bringing
the appellant to court following his arrest); R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93
(S.C.C.) (s. 9 violation conceded by Crown, the only issue was the remedy); R. v. Beare, [1987]
S.C.J. No. 92, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.) (challenging the fingerprinting of persons charged or
arrested); R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) (challenging the
provision in Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act that authorized police to stop motorists in the context of
a fixed RIDE checkstop); R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.)
(challenging the mandatory minimum sentence for importing a narcotic); R. v. Milne, [1987] S.C.J.
No. 73, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512 (S.C.C.) (challenging the continued detention as a dangerous offender where
the index offence has since been repealed); R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309
(S.C.C.) (challenging the imposition of indeterminate sentences of imprisonment under the dangerous
offender regime).
16
See R. v. Chaisson, [2006] S.C.J. No. 11, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 415 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Montour,
[1995] S.C.J. No. 48, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 416 (S.C.C.) (both cases restored acquittals ordered by trial
judges who found violations of s. 9, the bases for both decisions was the appellate court’s failure to
show sufficient deference to the trial judge’s findings); R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC
52 (S.C.C.) (s. 9 not discussed, case resolved based on violation of s. 8); R. v. Simpson, [1995]
S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) (a violation of s. 9 was conceded; the only issue was the
appellate court’s decision to overturn a stay ordered by the trial judge); R. v. Heywood, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (the majority found the offence of vagrancy by
loitering near playgrounds unconstitutional under s. 7 and did not address s. 9); R. v. Mellenthin,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.) (case resolved based on a violation of s. 8);
R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.) (s. 9 violation conceded, analysis
turns exclusively on remedy); R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.)
(minimum sentence for importing narcotics found to violate s. 12, s. 9 not discussed).
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remaining 16 cases, in 12 the Court found no violation.17 In two cases
the Court concluded that the impugned provision was contrary to section 9
but upheld the violations as reasonable limits under section 1.18 The
Court concluded that section 9 was violated in only two cases. Both
decisions involved challenges to legislation that the Court concluded
authorized arbitrary detentions that could not be justified under section 1.19
Although the numbers provide some evidence to suggest that the
Court’s approach to section 9 can be best described as conservative, they
tell only a small part of the story. A better understanding of the limitations
in the section 9 jurisprudence requires examining the types of cases in
which such claims have been raised and what the Court has had to say
about the purpose and meaning of the guarantee on these occasions.
Claims under section 9 of the Charter that have made their way
before the Supreme Court have generally taken one of two forms. First,
the guarantee has been used to challenge the constitutionality of a wide
array of legislation that authorizes detention or imprisonment. These
cases have ranged from attacks upon provincial laws that authorize the
police to stop motorists at organized checkpoints and through roving
and random stops,20 to challenges directed at Criminal Code21 provisions
17
See R. v. Decorte, [2004] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 21 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996]
3 S.C.R. 312 (S.C.C.); R. v. Macooh, [1993] S.C.J. No. 28, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (although a s. 9 challenge to the public
safety ground for denying bail was rejected, the public interest ground was invalidated for being
inconsistent with s. 11(e)); R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1291 (S.C.C.); R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.); R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Beare, [1987] S.C.J. No. 92, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.); R. v. Milne, [1987] S.C.J. No. 73,
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 512 (S.C.C.); R. v. Beare, [1987] S.C.J. No. 92, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.).
18
See R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Ladouceur,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.) (both cases involved a challenge to s. 189(a)(1) of
the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, the provision which authorized police to stop
motorists but which did not specify any criteria to govern the exercise of this discretion). In Hufsky,
the Court concluded that the section violated s. 9 but upheld the violation under s. 1 in a case where
police were carrying out a fixed roadblock sobriety checkstop under the authority of s. 189(a)(1). In
Ladouceur, the Court upheld the use of s. 189(a)(1) for the purpose of roving and random vehicle
stops, provided that the police limited their inquiries to motor vehicle concerns, i.e., driver sobriety,
licensing, insurance and the mechanical fitness of the vehicle.
19
See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]
1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) (the statutory provision barring those subject to security certificates from
seeking judicial review for at least 120 days violated s. 9); R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991]
1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) (the automatic committal to custody of those found not guilty by reason of
insanity violated s. 9).
20
See R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ladouceur,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Wilson, [1990] S.C.J. No. 54, [1990]
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that allow for the indefinite imprisonment of persons designated as
dangerous offenders.22 In these cases it has usually been the presence of
too little or too much discretion in the statutory authority conferred which
has proven determinative. Legislation that mandates a loss of liberty
without the need to consider any rational criteria or standards has been
held to operate “arbitrarily”.23 The Supreme Court has rightly recognized
that “it is the absence of discretion which would, in many cases, render
arbitrary the law’s application.”24 At the same time, the Court has found
legislation at odds with section 9 of the Charter when it confers unfettered
discretion on state agents to detain individuals. In such circumstances,
“[a] discretion is arbitrary . . . [because] . . . there are no criteria, express
or implied, which govern its exercise.”25
1 S.C.R. 1291 (S.C.C.). In these cases provincial legislation authorizing police to stop motorists
was found to be inconsistent with s. 9 as it did not provide any criteria to guide police in deciding
whom to stop, effectively granting unfettered discretion. But after citing statistical evidence
documenting the catastrophic effect of impaired and unlicensed drivers, the Court upheld the power
to conduct organized check-stops and random roving stops as reasonable limits in a free and
democratic society under s. 1. However, such stops are only permissible under s. 1 if their purpose
is limited to checking licences, insurance, driver sobriety and the mechanical fitness of vehicles.
Any probing beyond these limited purposes is, in theory, prohibited (see R. v. Ladouceur, [1990]
S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1287 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100,
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at 628 (S.C.C.)), and may transform a stop from an encounter which was
constitutionally permissible at its inception into an arbitrary detention. But see Brown v. Durham
(Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 16-17 (Ont. C.A.)
(holding that an ulterior motivation for such a stop, for instance, the pursuit of other investigative
interests, does not automatically render the detention arbitrary provided that the ulterior purpose is
not itself unconstitutional — for instance, a stop undertaken for the purpose of effecting an
unconstitutional search). Also see R. v. Duncanson, [1991] S.J. No. 373, 12 C.R. (4th) 86 (Sask. C.A.),
revd [1992] S.C.J. No. 31, 12 C.R. (4th) 98 (S.C.C.) (without addressing this issue). But see R. v.
Guenette, [1999] J.Q. no 760, 136 C.C.C. (3d) 311 (Que. C.A.).
21
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
22
See R. v. Milne, [1987] S.C.J. No. 73, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Lyons,
[1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) (upholding the dangerous offender scheme
because it “narrowly defines a class of offenders with respect to whom it may properly be invoked,
and prescribes quite specifically the conditions under which an offender may be designated as
dangerous”: R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 347 (S.C.C.)). Also see R. v.
Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 at 722-23 (S.C.C.) (upholding the sentencing
scheme for first degree murder on a similar basis).
23
See R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, at 1013 (S.C.C.) (the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 provisions requiring trial judges to automatically commit those found
not guilty by reason of insanity to strict custody, without considering their particular mental health
circumstances, found to be unconstitutional under s. 9).
24
R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 348 (S.C.C.).
25
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 633 (S.C.C.). See also R. v.
Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1276 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morales, [1992]
S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, at 740 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pearson, [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992]
3 S.C.R. 665, at 699-700 (S.C.C.) (noting that “detention is arbitrary if it is governed by unstructured
discretion”).
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Beyond identifying minimum constitutional requirements for legislative
standards that authorize an interference with liberty, the Supreme Court
recently added a procedural layer to section 9.26 In Charkaoui27 the Court
was faced with a constitutional challenge to the security certificate scheme
found in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.28 The Court found
a number of Charter violations, including a breach of section 9. According
to the Court, by precluding those subject to security certificates from
seeking judicial review of the reasons for their detention for at least 120
days, the legislative scheme ran a foul of section 9. The Court emphasized
that there was no compelling reason justifying the delay. This violated
section 9 because it amounted to a “complete denial of a timely detention
review”.29 The judgment leaves for another day what, if any, additional
procedural requirements might be constitutionally mandated in order for
a legislative scheme authorizing detention or imprisonment to comply
with section 9.
The second category of claims under section 9 of the Charter involves
challenges directed at the decision to detain or imprison in individual
cases. In the Charter’s early years, the struggle to give meaning to the
arbitrariness standard, in this context, reduced many Canadian courts to the
use of dictionary definitions. In a series of cases, courts across the country
held that the decision to detain or imprison will have been undertaken
“arbitrarily” if it is made in a “capricious”, “despotic”, “high-handed”,
“unreasonable”, or “unjustified” manner.30 In this way much of the
26

See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]
1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
27
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]
1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
28
S.C. 2001, c. 27.
29
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]
1 S.C.R. 350, at 403 (S.C.C.).
30
Initially, these terms were used to describe legislation which would offend s. 9. At that
time the Supreme Court had not yet provided more meaningful guidance on the topic: see R. v.
Mitchell, [1983] O.J. No. 3109, 6 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 210 (Ont. H.C.J.); R. v. Konechny, [1983]
B.C.J. No. 2244, 10 C.C.C. (3d) 233, at 254 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Smith, [1984] B.C.J. No. 1506, 11
C.C.C. (3d) 411, at 416-17 (B.C.C.A.), revd on other grounds [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, 34 C.C.C. (3d)
97 (S.C.C.); R. v. Langevin, [1984] O.J. No. 3159, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 336, at 358 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Slaney, [1985] N.J. No. 60, 22 C.C.C. (3d) 240, at 248 (Nfld. C.A.). The use of these terms was
soon extended to the context of challenges to specific decisions to detain or imprison: see Belliveau
v. Canada, [1984] A.C.F. no 162, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 138, at 146 (F.C.T.D.); R. v. McIntosh, [1984]
B.C.J. No. 1866, 29 M.V.R. 50, at 58 (B.C.C.A.); Maxie v. Canada (National Parole Board),
[1985] A.C.F. no 138, 47 C.R. (3d) 22, at 33 (F.C.T.D.); R. v. Williamson, [1986] A.J. No. 52,
25 C.C.C. (3d) 139, at 144-45 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Cayer, [1988] O.J. No. 1120, 66 C.R. (3d) 30,
at 43 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Baker, [1988] N.S.J. No. 421, 9 M.V.R. (2d) 165, at 167 (N.S.C.A.); R. v.
Sieben, [1989] A.J. No. 939, 51 C.C.C. (3d) 343, at 364 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Scott, [1990] B.C.J.
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jurisprudence served to “shift the search for meaning from one synonym
to another”.31 The elusive nature of the arbitrariness standard has been
the principal source of uncertainty surrounding the purpose and meaning
of the guarantee.
Uncertainty regarding the meaning of “arbitrariness” in this second
category of cases, those involving decisions by individual police officers
to detain or arrest, poses serious problems. The case law now makes
clear that an investigative detention that takes place in the absence of
objectively justifiable grounds to suspect that the person being detained is
involved in recently committed or unfolding criminal activity is unlawful.32
Similarly, a conventional arrest in the absence of reasonable and probable
grounds to believe that an individual has committed an indictable offence
is also illegal.33 Nevertheless, despite 25 years of litigation under section 9
of the Charter, it remains rather unclear as to when an unlawful interference
with individual liberty will qualify as arbitrary and run afoul of the
Constitution.
To date, the Supreme Court has refrained from expressly resolving
the issue. In Latimer,34 for example, the Court acknowledged that there
is uncertainty as to whether “unlawful” and “arbitrarily” are necessarily
one and the same for section 9 purposes, but carefully refrained from
deciding the issue.35 The clearest guidance from the Court has come in
the form of obiter suggesting that an arrest will violate section 9 of the
Charter if it is undertaken “because a police officer was biased towards
a person of a different race, nationality or colour, or that there was a
No. 2039, 24 M.V.R. (2d) 204, at 210 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Madsen, [1994] B.C.J. No. 709, 21 C.R.R.
(2d) 376, at 382 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Iron, [1987] S.J. No. 49, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 157, at 177-78 (Sask. C.A.)
(“capriciousness” adopted but “unjustified” considered and then specifically rejected).
31
R. v. Smith, [1984] B.C.J. No. 1506, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 411, at 423 (S.C.C.), Lambert J.A.,
dissenting (cautioning that while these “words may be illustrative of the meaning of ‘arbitrary’, . . .
they should not be regarded as definitive”). Also see R. v. Konechny, [1983] B.C.J. No. 2244, 10
C.C.C. (3d) 233, at 243 (B.C.C.A.), Lambert J.A., dissenting.
32
See R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.). Unfortunately, although
the Court makes clear that “an investigative detention that is carried out in accordance with the
common law power recognized in this case will not infringe the detainee’s rights under s. 9 of the
Charter” (R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52, at 71 (S.C.C.)) it does not address
whether or not an unlawful investigative detention will necessarily violate the guarantee.
33
See R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at 250-51 (S.C.C.).
34
R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.).
35
See R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at 232 (S.C.C.) (Lamer C.J.C.,
on behalf of the majority, indicated “it is not necessary to address that question, because Mr.
Latimer’s arrest was entirely lawful, and failing an attack against the legislative provision which
authorized the arrest, I do not see how a lawful arrest can contravene s. 9 of the Charter for being
arbitrary”).
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personal enmity between a police officer directed towards the person
arrested”.36 This observation has equal force with respect to all detentions,
not just those culminating in arrest. It is difficult to imagine anything more
unjustified and arbitrary than a detention undertaken for a discriminatory
motive37 or some other “improper” purpose.38
More recently, in Clayton,39 the ancillary powers doctrine was applied
by the Court to uphold a criminal investigative roadblock stop and search.
In the wee hours of the morning, police responded to a call that there
were men in a parking lot brandishing handguns. Police attended the
location within minutes and stopped a car the appellants were travelling
in just as it exited the parking lot. Both men were searched and a loaded
handgun was ultimately seized. Applying the ancillary powers doctrine,
the Court concluded that the police acted lawfully and therefore no
Charter violation resulted. At the beginning of its judgment, however, in
introducing its analysis, the Court said the following:
If the police conduct in detaining and searching Clayton and Farmer
amounted to a lawful exercise of their common law powers, there was
no violation of their Charter rights. If, on the other hand, the conduct
fell outside the scope of these powers, it represented an infringement
of the right under the Charter not to be arbitrarily detained or
subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure.40

(underlining and emphasis added)
Unfortunately, in framing the question as though there was only a
single right at issue and then bunching together the constitutional
implications of an illegal search and detention, the Court makes it less
than clear whether it intended to suggest that an unlawful detention is
necessarily a violation of section 9. Especially given the Court’s earlier
acknowledgment of the issue in Latimer41 and its decision in that case to
defer the question until it is ripe for consideration, there is a danger that

36

R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at 251-52 (S.C.C.).
Of course, if a police officer is motivated by some bias that implicates one of the prohibited
grounds of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter, then that section would also be violated.
38
See Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274,
131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 17 (Ont. C.A.) (in the “improper purposes” category the Court sensibly includes
“purposes which are illegal, purposes which involve the infringement of a person’s constitutional
rights and purposes which have nothing to do with the execution of a police officer’s public duty”).
39
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
40
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at 459 (S.C.C.).
41
R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.).
37
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the quoted passage from Clayton42 will have little effect. Faced with this
sort of uncertain obiter, trial judges may rather understandably continue
to take their lead from the opinions of Canadian appellate courts.
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Duguay43 remains the
leading case on the relationship between unlawful and arbitrary detentions.
It came soon after the Charter’s enactment. Like many early decisions
interpreting “arbitrarily”, it imports into the constitutional equation the need
for an oblique motive on the part of the arresting officer. According to
Duguay, someone who is unlawfully arrested is not necessarily “arbitrarily
detained”. This is because the basis for an arrest may fall “just short”
of the reasonable and probable grounds needed to arrest. Given this, as
MacKinnon A.C.J.O. explains,
The person making the arrest may honestly, though mistakenly, believe
that reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest exist and there may
be some basis for that belief. In those circumstances the arrest, though
subsequently found to be unlawful, could not be said to be capricious
or arbitrary. On the other hand, the entire absence of reasonable and
probable grounds for the arrest could support an inference that no
reasonable person could have genuinely believed that such grounds
existed. In such cases, the conclusion would be that the person arrested
was arbitrarily detained. Between these two ends of the spectrum, shading
from white to grey to black, the issue whether an accused was arbitrarily
detained will depend, basically, on two considerations: first, the particular
facts of the case, and secondly, the view taken by the court with
respect to the extent of the departure from the standard of reasonable
and probable grounds and the honesty of the belief and basis for the
belief in the existence of reasonable and probable grounds on the part
of the person making the arrest.44

(emphasis added)
45

Subsequently, in Simpson, the case that first applied the ancillary
powers doctrine to recognize an investigative detention power, the Ontario
Court of Appeal suggested that this very same sort of analysis is necessary
42

R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
[1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 296 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1989] S.C.J. No. 4,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.) (without addressing this issue) (Duguay).
44
R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 296 (Ont. C.A.). In Duguay,
the Court held that s. 9 of the Charter was violated because the police “had neither grounds nor an
honest belief that they had the necessary grounds” to arrest the three accused. R. v. Duguay, [1985]
O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 297 (Ont. C.A.).
45
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.).
43
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where a detention for investigative purposes is found to have taken place
unlawfully because of a deficiency in a police officer’s grounds to detain.46
Because of Duguay,47 a police officer’s good faith reliance on his or
her suspicions may cure the wrong of an unlawful detention or arrest. The
analysis in each case will turn on how far off the mark the officer’s grounds
happened to be when viewed objectively. If the officer’s grounds were
woefully deficient, then section 9 is violated. But if the officer’s grounds
fall “just short” of the legally required grounds, then the wrong of an
unlawful detention or arrest may not be a matter of constitutional concern.
Over the past 20 years courts across the country have endorsed the
unlawful versus arbitrary distinction recognized in Duguay.48 A number
of courts have emphasized the distinction in upholding unlawful detentions
as nevertheless constitutional under section 9 of the Charter.49 Some
courts have taken the cleansing potential of the unlawful versus arbitrary
dichotomy to rather unfortunate extremes.
For example, the Manitoba Court of Appeal has reasoned, in cases
involving actual “arrests” (i.e., the use of words of arrest, physical restraint,
handcuffs and a probing search for evidence and weapons) that section 9
was not violated because the police in fact had the requisite grounds to
carry out an investigative detention.50 Of course, what this sort of analysis
46
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 504 (Ont. C.A.) where
Doherty J.A., after introducing the investigative detention power to Canadian law, noted that:
“Following Duguay, supra, it may be that a detention although unlawful would not be arbitrary if
the officer erroneously believed on reasonable grounds that he had an articulable cause. I need not
decide whether such a belief could avoid an infringement of s. 9 of the Charter.”
47
R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1989] S.C.J.
No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.).
48
R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.). For example, see R. v.
Brown, [1987] N.S.J. No. 22, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54, at 67-68 (N.S.C.A.); Freeman v. West Vancouver
(District), [1992] B.C.J. No. 2146, 19 B.C.A.C. 81, at para. 29 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Campbell, [2003]
M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 452, at paras. 39-42 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Perello [2005] S.J. No. 60,
193 C.C.C. (3d) 151, at para. 40 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Payne, [2006] N.J. No. 259, 41 C.R. (6th) 234,
at para. 26 (Nfld. T.D.).
49
For some examples, see R. v. Pimental, [2000] M.J. No. 256, 145 Man. R. (2d) 295
(Man. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 359 (S.C.C.); R. v. Capistrano, [2000]
M.J. No. 340, 149 Man. R. (2d) 42 (Man. Q.B.); R. v. Speller, [1993] O.J. No. 2324, 47 M.V.R. (2d) 129
(Ont. Prov. Div.); R. v. Brown, [1987] N.S.J. No. 22, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54, at 67-68 (N.S.C.A.). But
see R. v. Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 377, at 388 (Nfld. C.A.), revd in the result
only [1995] S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) (implicitly questioning this approach but
without referring to R. v. Duguay, [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.)). Also see R. v.
Porquez, [1991] A.J. No. 103, 114 A.R. 1 (Alta. C.A.), leave refused (1991), 137 N.R. 160n
(S.C.C.) (holding that an arrest in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds violated s. 9 of
the Charter without ever addressing the subjective mind set of the arresting officers).
50
See R. v. Campbell, [2003] M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 452, at paras. 39-43 (Man. C.A.);
R. v. Willis, [2003] M.J. No. 117, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 406, at paras. 18-31 (Man. C.A.).
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ignores is that in such cases the police did not merely detain, they arrested.
To uphold such arrests as constitutional effectively transforms the lower
standard that justifies investigative detentions into the de facto standard
for conventional arrests. In other words, the distinction can all too easily
be used to uphold as constitutional, significant and illegal intrusions on
individual liberty.
It would seem that uncertainty about the purpose of section 9 has
led directly to the birth of unlawful versus arbitrary dichotomy. With the
passage of time, the distinction has grown more entrenched and its negative
effects have only seemed to spread. This has resulted in a section 9
jurisprudence that can fairly be described as impoverished.
In the remainder of this Part, it will be argued that what Duguay51
has to say about the meaning of “arbitrarily” in section 9 of the Charter
is wrong and long overdue for express overruling. By exploring why an
unlawful detention should necessarily equate with an “arbitrary” detention
under section 9, the larger purpose of this important constitutional
guarantee will hopefully become apparent.
In giving “arbitrarily” meaning, the Duguay52 Court did not have the
benefit of later Supreme Court decisions that explained the need for a
“purposive” approach in the interpretation of the Charter’s guarantees.53
Under this method, dictionary definitions are to be avoided.54 Instead,
the words used are to be read in a manner that best achieves the purpose
underlying the guarantee. In identifying that purpose, the court may look
to the larger objects of the Charter, the actual language used to express the
right, the historical origins of the guarantee (including its drafting history)
and its interrelationship to the other constitutional provisions. Ultimately,
the interpretation “should be a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed
at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the
full benefit of the Charter’s protection”.55 These factors each point
51

R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).
53
See Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.); Reference re
Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 499
(S.C.C.); R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 641 (S.C.C.), Le Dain J., dissenting in the result only.
54
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.)
(instructing that the meaning of the Charter’s guarantees should not “be determined by recourse to a
dictionary, nor for that matter, by reference to the rules of statutory construction. The task of
expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute”).
55
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344 (S.C.C.).
Also see S.R. Peck, “An Analytical Framework for the Application of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 6-30; P.W. Hogg, “The Charter of Rights
52
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toward an interpretation that treats any unlawful detention as necessarily
arbitrary and therefore a violation of section 9 of the Charter.
Any effort to reconcile the Duguay56 decision with the purposive
approach runs into immediate difficulty. Like most early judgments
interpreting section 9, the case is based on dictionary definitions that
transform a malevolent motivation into the touchstone for arbitrariness.
Such a reading is inconsistent with the larger objects of the Charter and
its legal rights guarantees. 57 By subordinating legality and individual
liberty interests to the subjective mindset of an arresting officer, this
interpretation cuts against the very purpose of the Charter. If protecting
the individual vis-à-vis the state is the primary objective, it makes little
sense to view the encounter from the perspective of the responsible state
official rather than from the perspective of the individual whose liberty
has been unlawfully suspended. For the person aggrieved it is cold
comfort that a state official’s grounds to detain or arrest fall “just short”
of what the law requires. A “generous” interpretation would recognize
that an unlawful detention or arrest is necessarily arbitrary and contrary
to section 9 of the Charter.58
This interpretation is made more compelling by its connection to the
historic approach for protecting liberty in Canada. The Anglo-Canadian
common law constitution has long required that any interference with
individual liberty be based on lawful authority. This proposition, known
as the “principle of legality”59 requires that “every official act must be

and American Theories of Interpretation” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87, at 97-103 (explaining
the “purposive” approach).
56
R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).
57
See Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155 (S.C.C.)
(the purpose of the Charter is “the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties”); R. v.
Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1173 (S.C.C.) (“The legal rights guaranteed
by the Charter are designed inter alia to circumscribe these coercive powers of the state within
boundaries of justice and fairness to the individual.”); R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990]
2 S.C.R. 151, at 179 (S.C.C.) (“[I]t is to the control of the superior power of the state vis-à-vis the
individual who has been detained by the state, and thus placed in its power, that s. 7 and the related
provisions that follow are primarily directed.”). For a discussion regarding the purpose of the legal
rights guarantees, see James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 6-12.
58
See P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, ON:
Carswell, 1997-) at 46-5 (after acknowledging the effect of R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C.
(3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1989] S.C.J. No. 4, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93 (S.C.C.), the author writes that
“[p]robably, . . . strict compliance with the law is a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition
for compliance with s. 9”).
59
See Leonard Herschel Leigh, Police Powers in England and Wales, 2d ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1985), at 32-33. Professor Hogg refers to this idea as the “principle of validity”. See
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justified by law”.60 This idea has an extraordinarily long history: it can
be traced back to Blackstone, 61 Entick v. Carrington,62 and even the
Magna Carta.63
Not surprisingly then, Dicey characterized this concept as central to
the “rule of law”. For him the antithesis of this “fundamental principle
of the constitution” was the exercise of “arbitrary power”64 Of specific
interest, given our interpretive task, is one of the ways in which Dicey
illustrated this point in his seminal text on English constitutional law,
noting that the English constitution forbids “arbitrary arrest”.65 This
evidences a long history of equating illegality with arbitrariness. But
looking this far back is not essential. The drafting history also provides
a compelling and more contemporary justification for choosing this
interpretation.
At least on a superficial level, section 9 of the Charter seems capable
of being traced to section 2(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights66 of 1960.
That section provided that “no law of Canada shall be construed or applied
so as to authorize or effect the arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile
of any person[.]” Unfortunately that section, like much of the federally
legislated Bill of Rights, had no practical impact, never proving decisive
before any appellate court.67 Nevertheless, the fact that “arbitrariness”

P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1997-),
at 31-4.
60
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Carswell,
1997-).
61
See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979), at 130-31.
62
(1765), 19 State Trials 1029 at 1067, 95 E.R. 807 (Ct. Common Pleas).
63
See Magna Carta, 9 Hen. III, c. 29, art. 39.
64
A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1915), at 198. He elaborates upon this by explaining that,
[t]he right to personal liberty as understood in England means in substance a person’s right
not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner that
does not admit of legal justification. . . . personal freedom in this sense of the term is
secured in England by the strict maintenance of the principle that no man can be arrested or
imprisoned except in due course of law, i.e. . . . under some legal warrant or authority . . .”
See also at 203-204.
65
A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1915), at 193, 196.
66
S.C. 1960, c. 44; R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
67
Professor Tarnopolsky noted that “[t]here are only a few reported cases in which this
clause was raised but it did not directly affect the result in any instance.” See Walter Surma
Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2d rev. ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975),
at 235. That said, Professor Tarnopolsky was of the view that:
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figures prominently in both provisions is no accident. Both seem to have
been influenced by article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,68 which provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.”69 There was, however, another international
influence helping to shape the drafting of section 9. In 1966, after the
Bill of Rights70 but long before the Charter, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights71 came into effect. It included an article that
was undoubtedly instrumental in shaping the language that ultimately made
its way into what would become section 9 of the Charter.72 Its influence is
best considered in the context of other developments that shaped the
ultimate wording of section 9, and also served to influence the wording
of what would become section 8. As a result, it is sensible to consider
earlier versions of both guarantees in tandem.
During the constitutional negotiations between the provincial and
federal governments in 1980, the criminal process was not at the top of
anyone’s agenda. The October 1980 draft of the Charter, placed before
the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons,
included a section designed to foreclose the exclusion of evidence as a
remedy for constitutional violations.73 Like earlier drafts, it contained a
series of legal rights guarantees.74 In response to strong objections from
the provinces to the wording in the August 1980 draft, 75 the federal
government significantly reworded what would become sections 8 and 9:

. . . the proscription here is against detention, imprisonment or exile without specific
authorization under existing law. And further, that a law giving power to detain, imprison or exile,
cannot grant such a power to be exercised “unreasonably” or “without reasonable cause”.
68
G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71.
69
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.
No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71, art. 9.
70
Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
71
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 UN
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).
72
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 UN
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 9(1).
73
See October 1980 Draft of the Charter, s. 26, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1989), at 751.
74
October 1980 Draft of the Charter, ss. 7-14, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1989).
75
See Provincial Proposal, August 29, 1980, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1989), at 683-85. The provinces unanimously sought the deletion of s. 7, and — with the
exception of New Brunswick and Newfoundland — sought changes to the wording of ss. 8 and 9.
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October 1980 Draft77

7. Everyone has the right to be secure 8. Everyone has the right not to be subjected
against unreasonable search and seizure.
to search or seizure except on grounds, and
in accordance with procedures, established
by law.
8. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 9. Everyone has the right not to be detained
detained or imprisoned.
or imprisoned except on grounds, and in
accordance with procedures, established
by law.

For the provinces, the goal of these changes was to “clarify and limit
the scope of legal rights”.78 This led to modifications in the language of
both sections 8 and 9 that would have done little more than codify the
principle of legality (“except on grounds, and in accordance with
procedures, established by law”).
A number of organizations that made representations before the Special
Joint Committee were critical of the October 1980 draft. They feared
that without a remedies provision, the Charter would prove ineffective.
As a result, they urged the Special Joint Committee to add a provision
that would at least allow for the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence. These same groups also expressed grave doubts about the
wording found in the October 1980 draft of sections 8 and 9. 79 For
example, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association observed that the two
provisions were little more than “a verbal illusion”; they “pretend to give
us something” while granting “us nothing more than we already have”.80
They pointed out, correctly, that these sections still left open the potential
76
See August 1980 Draft of the Charter, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1989), at 669.
77
See October 1980 Draft of the Charter, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1989), at 743.
78
Provincial Proposal, August 29, 1980, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s
Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1989), at 681.
79
See Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, vol. 1, No. 7, at 11-12, 15-16,
27-29 (November 18, 1980) (Canadian Civil Liberties Association), vol. 1, No. 7, at 89-90, 92
(November 18, 1980) (Canadian Jewish Congress), vol. 1, No. 15, at 8, 15, 18 (November 28, 1980)
(Canadian Bar Association).
80
Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, vol. 1, No. 7, at 12 (November
18, 1980) (Mr. Alan Borovoy, General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association).
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for legislation authorizing searches and seizures or detentions and
imprisonments on the most arbitrary of bases. The federal government
took these concerns seriously, responding with amendments that — with
some refinement by the Special Joint Committee — ultimately became
sections 8, 9 and 24 of the Charter.81 In putting forward these “major
changes”, Jean Chrétien (then federal Minister of Justice and Attorney
General) explained that the changes to sections 8 and 9 meant that:
. . . the fact that procedures are established by law will not be conclusive
proof that search and seizure or detention is legal. Such procedures and
the laws on which they are based will have to meet the tests of being
reasonable and not being arbitrary. 82

The goal of the changes following the October 1980 draft were clear
— to strengthen, not weaken — the protection afforded by sections 8
and 9.83 Later, when questions were raised as to whether legality should
be specifically mentioned in section 9, a Deputy Minister of Justice assured
the Committee that such a change was unnecessary because if a detention
“were illegal, . . . against the law, then it would be annulled by the
courts for that very reason”.84 To the limited extent that the “framers’
intent” may be gleaned from such historical materials,85 it would appear
to have been assumed that illegal detentions would be subsumed by the
arbitrariness standard contained in section 9 of the Charter.
On such a reading section 9 would operate very much like article
9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In part,
that provision indicates that: “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention [and that] [n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty
81
See January 1981 draft of the Charter, ss. 8, 9 and 24, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky,
Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989), at 771.
82
Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, vol. 3, No. 36, at 10-11
(January 12, 1981) (Hon. Jean Chrétien, Minister of Justice).
83
See January 1981 Draft, reproduced in Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s Constitution Act 1982
& Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989), at 768.
84
Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, No. 46, at 116-17 (January 27,
1981) (see questions by Senator Asselin and the responses of the Deputy Minister of Justice,
Mr. Tassé).
85
See Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 504-509 (S.C.C.) (holding that courts may consider testimony before the
Special Joint Committee in interpreting the Charter, but cautioning that because of the multiplicity
of actors involved in negotiation, drafting and adoption, the words of a few civil servants cannot be
considered determinative and should therefore be given “minimal weight”).
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except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law.”86 This wording looks like an amalgam of section 9
and its earlier drafts. As Canada is a signatory to the Covenant, having
agreed to implement its provisions into its domestic law, a reading of
section 9 that equates arbitrariness with illegality would better serve to
fulfil Canada’s international treaty obligations. Although not a conclusive
interpretive consideration, this is an additional reason for reading
“arbitrarily” to include “unlawful”.87
Finally, if the Supreme Court chooses to expressly endorse this
approach, it would bring consistency to the interpretation of the legal
rights guarantees. Legality, for instance, is a precondition for a search or
seizure to be “reasonable” under section 8 of the Charter. 88 Even a
commendable motive on the part of the police or grounds that fall “just
short” of the legal standard cannot cure the wrong of an unlawful intrusion
upon reasonable privacy expectations. That said, it is worth noting that
this was not always the case. Much as with section 9 and unlawful
detentions, early appellate court judgments had concluded that not every
unlawful search or seizure would necessarily be “unreasonable” and violate
section 8.89 Thankfully, however, the Supreme Court did away with this

86
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 UN
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 9(1).
87
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 UN
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), art. 2(2) (obligating signatories to implement
the Covenant’s guarantees). See Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta),
[1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 349 (S.C.C.), Dickson C.J.C., dissenting (“the Charter
should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar
provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified . . . [such international
norms are a] . . . persuasive source for interpretation of the provisions of the Charter”). This view
was later adopted by a majority of the Court: see Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at 1056-57 (S.C.C.). Also see W.A. Schabas, International
Human Rights Law & The Canadian Charter, 2d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1996), at 34-49
(discussing the use of international right instruments to interpret the Charter).
88
See R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.) (holding
that, in addition to other requirements, to be “reasonable” a search or seizure “must be authorized
by law”); R. v. Wiley, [1993] S.C.J. No. 96, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263, at 273 (S.C.C.) (holding that the
required authority may come from “common law principles or statutory provisions”). Also see Don
Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 3d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2001), at 263
(noting the dissimilarity and arguing that viewing unlawful detentions as necessarily arbitrary
would make s. 9 “a far more powerful protection”).
89
See R. v. Heisler, [1984] A.J. No. 1008, 11 C.C.C. (3d) 475 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Cameron,
[1984] B.C.J. No. 3158, 16 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Noble, [1984] O.J. No. 3395, 16
C.C.C. (3d) 146, at 167 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Benz, [1986] O.J. No. 227, 27 C.C.C. (3d) 454, at 466-67
(Ont. C.A.).
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impossible distinction.90 In the relatively early years of the Charter, the
Court held that the first essential precondition for any search or seizure
to be considered “reasonable” under section 8 is that it be “authorized by
law”.91 In other words, given the long-standing importance of the principle
of legality, the Supreme Court rather sensibly read it as the starting point
for any “reasonable” search or seizure.
Strangely, the Supreme Court has carefully avoided doing the same
for section 9. The closest the Court has come is a recent and rather
overdue acknowledgment that the guarantee “expresses one of the most
fundamental norms of the rule of law. The state may not detain arbitrarily,
but only in accordance with law”.92 Unfortunately, this statement came
in a case involving a challenge to a legislative scheme, not in the context
of a challenge to the decision to detain in an individual case. Be that as
it may, this observation seems entirely in keeping with an interpretation
of section 9 that would equate any unlawful interference with individual
liberty as an arbitrary and unconstitutional one.
None of this is to suggest that the good intentions of law enforcement
are irrelevant to constitutional outcomes. To the contrary, as the Supreme
Court’s seminal decision under section 24(2) of the Charter makes clear,
in deciding whether or not to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence,
among other factors, a court must consider if a violation occurred
“in good faith, or was inadvertent or of a merely technical nature, or
whether it was deliberate, wilful or flagrant”.93 This provides further
support for reconsidering what “arbitrarily” means. It makes little sense
to count a police officer’s good intentions twice in the constitutional
analysis, especially when an interest as fundamental as individual liberty
is at stake.
As this review hopefully makes plain, the ultimate purpose of the
guarantee would appear to be the protection of individual liberty interests
from unjustified state interference. It was this idea that the drafters were
attempting to capture in the language chosen to articulate the guarantee.
90
The unworkable nature of this distinction has sometimes been acknowledged by judges
forced to grapple with it. See, e.g., Ontario v. Spencer, [1999] O.J. No. 3165, 66 C.R.R. (2d) 362,
at 372 (Ont. C.J.) where the trial judge conceded that: “Despite the finding in Duguay, I have great
difficulty in determining how in such circumstances an arrest so unlawful as to not meet any of the
important codified criteria could be found to be anything but arbitrary.”
91
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.).
92
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]
1 S.C.R. 350, at 400 (S.C.C.).
93
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 285 (S.C.C.) (quoting from
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 652 (S.C.C.), Le Dain J. dissenting).
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The October 1980 draft only went part way by employing phrasing that
would entrench the principle of legality. The drafters quickly realized
that this was inadequate given their aspiration for a constitutional guarantee
that would safeguard individual liberty against unjustified state interference.
This far more ambitious goal also required the use of wording that would
entitle courts to measure the adequacy of the standards and protections
included in any legislated scheme that authorizes a deprivation of liberty.
Unfortunately, experience has shown that without timely guidance from
the Supreme Court, the word chosen — arbitrarily — has leant itself to a
narrow interpretation that is not in keeping with the true purpose of
section 9. A purposive reading reveals the true object of this constitutional
right and lays bare the means by which its fundamentally important purpose
can be realized.
First, section 9 serves to entrench the long-standing Anglo-Canadian
constitutional principle that government cannot interfere with individual
liberty absent lawful authority to the contrary. In order for this important
constitutional principle to have practical meaning, any unlawful interference
with individual liberty must necessarily be treated as “arbitrary” and a
violation of section 9 of the Charter.
Second, the guarantee supplements that historic safeguard by
empowering courts to scrutinize laws authorizing detention or imprisonment
and to invalidate those that would operate “arbitrarily”. The Supreme
Court has already put the second aspect of the guarantee into action —
developing section 9 standards for assessing the constitutional adequacy
of criteria and procedures governing state authority to interfere with
individual liberty.
In recent years there have been mixed signals from the courts on
whether or not unlawful detentions will be viewed as inherently arbitrary
and a violation of section 9.94 In maintaining this distinction, the courts

94

See R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 505-506 (Ont. C.A.),
wherein the Court concluded that an investigative detention based on deficient grounds “was not
justified and therefore breached the appellants’ rights under s. 9 of the Charter”. See also R. v.
Monney, [1997] O.J. No. 4806, 120 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 148-49 (Ont. C.A.) (focusing upon
“unjustifiable” from amongst the available synonyms), revd [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, 133 C.C.C. (3d)
129 (S.C.C.) (finding the detention at issue lawful thereby avoiding this issue); R. v. Mitchell,
[1987] N.S.J. No. 430, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 141, at 152 (N.S.C.A.) (holding that s. 9 is violated when
“a person is detained or imprisoned without any legal justification”). But see Brown v. Durham
(Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11-12 (Ont. C.A.)
(repeating a principle that keeps the ratio from R. v. Duguay, [1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289
(Ont. C.A.) alive — “not all unlawful detentions are necessarily arbitrary”). See also Collins v.
Brantford Police Services Board, [2001] O.J. No. 3778, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 405, at paras. 11, 19

232

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

are no doubt concerned about all of the potential ramifications of equating
illegality with arbitrariness. A conclusion that each is synonymous would
have far-reaching implications beyond unjustified detentions and arrests.
For instance, if it were established that a police officer arrested in
circumstances where he or she was obligated not to under the Criminal
Code,95 or failed to release someone following an arrest as the Code
required,96 the resulting unlawful detention would be characterized as
arbitrary and unconstitutional.97 Similarly, a failure on the part of police
to bring an accused before a justice within 24 hours of an arrest98 would
necessarily be unconstitutional — regardless of any good explanation
for the delay.99 No doubt, these ripple effects are a strong incentive for
courts to maintain their commitment to the Duguay approach. They fear
being required to characterize as “arbitrary” — and unconstitutional —
unlawful detentions resulting from “a technical error of process”.100
To date, a major mistake under section 9 of the Charter has been the
muddying of conceptual waters through the creation of an unnecessary
dichotomy between unlawful and arbitrary detentions. Although, as noted
above, a similar trend emerged under the early section 8 Charter
jurisprudence, as to whether “unlawful” searches or seizures were
necessarily “unreasonable”, the Supreme Court quickly put an end to this
debate by making lawful authority a precondition for reasonableness.101
The result has been much clearer constitutional standards and more
(Ont. C.A.) (citing R. v. Duguay with approval in reiterating that an unlawful detention does not
necessarily result in an arbitrary detention that violates s. 9).
95
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 495(2).
96
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 497, 498.
97
It is quite difficult to establish an unlawful detention on this basis. Usually, cases where
an unlawful and arbitrary detention is made out are those in which police have applied a policy to
arrest and hold anyone charged with a certain type of offence, irrespective of their personal
circumstances. See, for example, R. v. Ware, [1987] B.C.J. No. 492, 49 M.V.R. 97 (B.C. Co. Ct.);
R. v. Christiensen, [1987] B.C.J. No. 1786, 3 M.V.R. (2d) 116 (B.C. Co. Ct.); R. v. Pithart, [1987]
B.C.J. No. 633, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 150 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
98
The police are obligated to bring those they arrest before a justice “without unreasonable
delay” and “in any event” within 24 hours. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 503.
99
See R. v. Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 377 (Nfld. C.A.), affd in part and
revd in part [1995] S.C.J. No. 12, 95 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (S.C.C.) (accused brought before justice 48
hours after her arrest, characterized as a “major violation of a statutory provision . . . [that] . . . must
be viewed as arbitrary”). But see R. v. Tam, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1428, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 196
(B.C.C.A.) (where the requirement was missed by an hour and a half with good logistical reasons
for the delay — although unlawful — the officer’s good faith caused the Court to refrain from finding
an arbitrary detention).
100
R. v. Simpson, [1994] N.J. No. 69, 88 C.C.C. (3d) 377, at 388 (Nfld. C.A.) (offered to
explain why an “an unlawful detention is not necessarily an arbitrary detention”).
101
See notes 90 and 91 and accompanying text.
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well-defined statutory search and seizure powers.102 The technical or
inadvertent nature of a constitutional violation is best dealt with when
fashioning the appropriate remedy. This is the great benefit of a
discretionary exclusionary rule. It permits the courts to interpret the
constitution’s guarantees purposively, free from concerns that an overly
generous approach might have an unfair exclusionary effect in some
unforeseeable future case.103
Recognizing that unlawful detentions or arrests — those undertaken
without the legally required grounds — are necessarily unconstitutional
under section 9 of the Charter does not bring an end to our task. You will
remember that our goal was to also revisit the meaning of “detention”
from a perspective that openly takes into account the purpose of section
9, which we have now identified as being the protection of individual
liberty from unjustified state interference.

III. THE EFFECT OF READING “DETENTION” PURPOSIVELY
To engage section 9’s protection, the interaction between an
individual and a state actor must first qualify either as a “detention” or
as an “imprisonment”. Unlike “detention”, the objective indicators of
“imprisonment” are much more obvious and not at all controversial. The
presence of prison bars, locked doors, prison uniforms and jail guards
clearly signify a deprivation of liberty that is sufficiently prolonged to
warrant the more severe label of “imprisonment”. Unfortunately, “detention”
provides a far less certain and therefore much more controversial standard
for engaging the protection of the constitutional guarantee.
Beyond section 9, “detention” also appears as one of the threshold
requirements for triggering the protections found in section 10, which is
engaged “on arrest or detention”. It was a case involving section 10(b),
the right to counsel, which first raised the meaning of this important
term before the Supreme Court.
In R. v. Therens,104 a motorist involved in a single-vehicle car accident
accompanied a police officer back to the police division, in response to
a breath demand, for the purpose of taking a breathalyzer test. The
102
See James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers
and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1.
103
See James Stribopoulos, “Lessons from the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American
Exclusionary Rule Debate” (1999) 22 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 77, at 136-38.
104
[1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
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motorist was not told about his right to counsel. One of the issues before
the Supreme Court was whether the motorist was “detained” during the
period following the breath demand but preceding his arrest.
Although the Court divided on the ultimate result, Le Dain J.’s
opinion represented the views of the majority on the issue of detention.
In concluding that there was indeed a “detention” in this case, Le Dain J.
persuasively reasoned that the very narrow construction given to that
term under the Canadian Bill of Rights105 should not be controlling of its
meaning under the Charter.106 In coming to this conclusion on behalf of
the Court, Le Dain J. pointed out “that the Charter must be regarded,
because of its constitutional character, as a new affirmation of rights and
freedoms and of judicial power and responsibility in relation to their
protection”.107 Beyond the general purpose of the Charter, Le Dain J.’s
interpretation of “detention” was also informed by the more specific
purpose of section 10.108 Bearing in mind these considerations, Le Dain J.
identified the existence of “compulsory restraint” as being the key to the

105

S.C. 1960, c. 44.
In R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.), the Supreme
Court read the term “detention” found in s. 2(c) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44
very narrowly, refusing to characterize circumstances virtually identical to those presented in R. v.
Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) as anything other than voluntary
compliance. On this view “detention” was reserved for cases of “compulsory restraint”, in other
words , actual “physical constraint”, situations where an individual is being “held in custody”: R. v.
Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471, at 478 (S.C.C.).
107
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 638 (S.C.C.). Justice Le
Dain also went on to explain two further reasons for rejecting the narrow definition from R. v.
Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.). First, he acknowledged that the
judiciary had felt rather restrained in its use of the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 given
that it was simply legislation and therefore lacked constitutional status. In addition, given that the
Canadian Bill of Rights did not include any equivalent to s. 1 of the Charter, a narrow interpretation
of “detention” was the only means by which the Court in Chromiak could place reasonable limits
on the right to counsel. R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 639 (S.C.C.).
Of course, s. 1 of the Charter allows the Supreme Court to balance individual and state interests in a
much more transparent way.
108
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 641-42 (S.C.C.), where he
noted that:
The purpose of s. 10 of the Charter is to ensure that in certain situations a person is
made aware of the right to counsel and is permitted to retain and instruct counsel without
delay. The situations specified by s. 10 — arrest and detention — are obviously not the only
ones in which a person may reasonably require the assistance of counsel, but they are situations in
which the restraint of liberty might otherwise effectively prevent access to counsel or induce a
person to assume that he or she is unable to retain and instruct counsel. In its use of the word
“detention”, s. 10 of the Charter is directed to a restraint of liberty other than arrest in which
a person may reasonably require the assistance of counsel but might be prevented or impeded
from retaining and instructing counsel without delay but for the constitutional guarantee.
106
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meaning of “detention”.109 He acknowledged that such restraint might
take varying forms.
Compulsory restraint may involve physical interference with the
individual’s freedom of movement.110 So, for example, if a police officer
grasps an individual’s arm, uses handcuffs or confines someone in the back
seat of a police cruiser, a “detention” would obviously seem to result.
Compulsion can also be of a psychological or mental nature, noted
Le Dain J. So, for example, where an individual acquiesces in response
to a demand or direction by a police officer and reasonably believes that
the choice to do otherwise does not exist, that person is “detained”. On
this view of things, where non-compliance with a demand or direction
would constitute an offence, as it would have in Therens,111 given the
statutory duty to furnish a breath sample, Le Dain J. reasoned that
acquiescence cannot be considered voluntary and should be viewed as
sufficiently compelled to result in a “detention”.112
In a passage that is arguably obiter,113 Le Dain J. went on to make a
rather important observation about the reality of most interactions between
members of the public and the police. He indicated:
Although it is not strictly necessary for purposes of this case,
I would go further. In my opinion, it is not realistic, as a general rule,
to regard compliance with a demand or direction by a police officer as
truly voluntary, in the sense that the citizen feels that he or she has the
choice to obey or not, even where there is in fact a lack of statutory or
common law authority for the demand or direction and therefore an
absence of criminal liability for failure to comply with it. Most citizens
are not aware of the precise legal limits of police authority. Rather
than risk the application of physical force or prosecution for wilful
obstruction, the reasonable person is likely to err on the side of caution,
assume lawful authority and comply with the demand. The element
of psychological compulsion, in the form of a reasonable perception
of suspension of freedom of choice, is enough to make the restraint of
liberty involuntary. Detention may be effected without the application
or threat of application of physical restraint if the person concerned
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R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 642 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 642 (S.C.C.)
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R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 642-43 (S.C.C.).
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Strictly speaking, the ratio of the case is tied closely to its actual circumstances, i.e., that
a “detention” results where an individual is subject to and acquiesces in a breath demand, given that
non-compliance is an offence.
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submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes
that the choice to do otherwise does not exist. 114

On a number of subsequent occasions the Supreme Court has
unconditionally endorsed what Therens115 had to say about the meaning
of “detention” both of the physical and psychological kind.116 This has
periodically included express approval of Le Dain J.’s obiter comments
about the reality of how a police demand or direction will tend to
compel compliance on the part of most reasonable members of the
community.117
Not long after Therens118 was decided, its definition of “detention”
was transplanted from section 10 to section 9. The Supreme Court
concluded that there is “no reason in principle why the general approach
to the meaning of detention reflected in those cases should not be applied to
the meaning of ‘detained’ in s. 9”.119 This threshold requirement for
engaging section 9 therefore took shape without any express reference
to the purpose underlying this important Charter guarantee.
Because of statutory obligations, when motorists comply with a
direction to stop their vehicles120 or agree to provide a breath sample in
response to a breath demand,121 they are clearly “detained” for section 9
114

R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 644 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
116
See R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 648 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296, at 312-15 (S.C.C.); R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J.
No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, at 55 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R.
236, at 272-73 (S.C.C.); Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993]
S.C.J. No. 38, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at 1065-66 (S.C.C.).
117
See R. v. Nolan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 43, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 300 (S.C.C.) where the
Court cited this passage before expressly agreeing that: “when a citizen is confronted with police
authority, there is always a strong element of ‘psychological compulsion’ in any police demand”.
See also Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at 1066 (S.C.C.).
118
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
119
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 632 (S.C.C.). See also R. v.
Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257, at 1277 (S.C.C.).
120
See R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.) wherein the Court
indicated, at 631-32:
. . . the random stop of the appellant for the purposes of the spot check procedure, although
of relatively brief duration, resulted in a detention of the appellant within the meaning of
s. 9 of the Charter. It fell within the general concept of detention that was applied in R. v.
Therens. . . . By the random stop for the purposes of the spot check procedure the police
officer assumed control over the movement of the appellant by a demand or direction that
might have significant legal consequence, and there was penal liability for refusal to comply
with the demand or direction.
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See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
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purposes. In almost all other circumstances, however, whether an encounter
between a police officer and an individual constitutes a “detention”
ultimately depends on the particular facts of a given case.
In most cases that come before the courts, the facts are invariably
viewed through the distorting influence of hindsight, where the court is
being asked to grant Charter relief for the benefit of a factually guilty
accused. In other words, these are the cases in which police suspicions
and perseverance have paid off, yielding evidence of criminality in the
form of either a confession or contraband, and sometimes both. To date,
these cases have been adjudicated without any express acknowledgment
of the purpose of section 9. That purpose, it will be remembered, is to
protect everyone, innocent or guilty, from unjustified state interferences
with individual liberty. Unfortunately, in actual cases that important
objective can sometimes become obscured from view by the factual guilt
of the claimant who seeks redress for an alleged constitutional wrong
through the exclusion of incriminating evidence. From this vantage point,
the cases of innocent individuals who are subjected to unjustified state
interference with their liberty, either in the form of an unlawful detention
or arrest, are out of sight. These are the individuals who are ultimately
released by police because their detention or arrest failed to yield evidence
of wrongdoing.122
The fact that an individual proves to be innocent does not, however,
necessarily mean that his or her detention was unjustified. Police officers
are legally entitled to detain and even arrest based on probabilities,
not certainties. The very purpose of allowing the police to detain for
investigative purposes where they possess reasonable suspicion that
someone is involved in recently committed or unfolding criminal activity
122
Some American legal scholars have theorized that hindsight may distort judicial reasoning
in this very way. See William J. Stuntz, “Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies” (1991) 77
Va. L. Rev. 881, at 912-13, making this point in the American context. See also Carole S. Steiker,
“Second Thoughts About First Principles” (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820, at 852-53. More generally,
the potential influence of so-called “hindsight bias” is extraordinarily well documented within
psychology. For a review of the literature, see Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, “Hindsight: Biased
Judgment of Past Events After the Outcomes are Known” (1990) 107:3 Psychological Bulletin 311.
Some studies have specifically linked this phenomenon to legal decision-making, although each
such study has necessarily involved simulations. See J.D. Casper, K. Benedict & J.R. Kelly,
“Cognitions, attitudes, and decision making in search and seizure cases” (1988) 18 J. App. Soc.
Psych. 93; Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Mark S. Sobus, “An Integration of Hindsight Bias and
Counterfactual Thinking: Decision-Making and Drug Courier Profiles” (1997) 21:5 Law and Human
Behaviour 539. In Canada, given the existence of a discretionary exclusionary rule, the influence of
hindsight should in theory be diminished. See James Stribopoulos, “Lessons from the Pupil: A Canadian
Solution to the American Exclusionary Rule Debate” (1999) 22 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 77,
at 131-38. Whether it is, in fact, seems incapable of empirical verification.
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is to allow that officer to get to the bottom of things and ascertain whether
or not an arrest is warranted.123 As a result, a great many innocents may
very well get swept up in the net of reasonable suspicion. These are not the
cases that I mean to capture when I use the term “unjustified detention”.
Instead, our concern is deservedly on those cases of innocent
individuals who are subject to detention or arrest in the absence of
objectively justifiable grounds. Some of these detentions may result from
errors made in good faith on the part of the police, for example, where a
police officer honestly but mistakenly concludes that she has sufficient
grounds to either detain for investigative purposes or arrest.124 There
is also the very real risk that some such detentions may be motivated
either consciously or, much more likely, subconsciously, by nefarious
considerations, for example by an individual’s age, economic circumstances,
ethnicity or race. For example, in recent years a growing body of evidence
has emerged which strongly suggests that both Aboriginals125 and African
Canadians126 are stopped by police at disproportionately higher rates
123
This is the standard that controls whether the police are legally entitled to detain an individual
for criminal investigative purposes. See R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 2004 SCC 52 (S.C.C.).
124
That said, some have argued that claims of “good faith” should be considered in a broader
context, to take into account how well police forces are fulfilling their obligations to provide rank
and file officers with adequate training regarding the parameters of their legal powers. See Casey
Hill, “The Role of Fault in Section 24(2) of the Charter” in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s
Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1993) 57, at 73. See also R. v. Clayton,
[2005] O.J. No. 1078, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at paras. 82-91 (Ont. C.A.), revd [2007] S.C.J. No. 32,
220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). In Clayton, at the Supreme Court, the Court, rather remarkably, counselled
against close scrutiny of police training in individual cases, indicating at para. 51:
In their testimony, the police did not expressly advert to the factors relevant to the
exercise of their ancillary powers or explain the way they balanced the pros and cons of deciding
whether to set up the perimeter surveillance. What is under constitutional scrutiny is the
police conduct, not police training. The officers’ good faith in carrying out their duties is the
issue in this case. To go further and examine the training behind such conduct would risk
transforming the inquiry into a protracted pedagogical review of marginal relevance to whether
the police conduct itself represented a breach of sufficient severity to warrant excluding the
evidence.
This conclusion unfortunately provides police organizations with little practical incentive to provide
rank and file officers with proper training regarding the legal parameters of their powers.
125
See Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report of
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba. Volume 1: The Justice System and Aboriginal People
(Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991), at 595; Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and Its
Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, Justice on Trial (Edmonton: Task Force, 1991),
at 2-5, 2-46 to 2-51.
126
See Ontario, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice
System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), at 349-60. See Scot Wortley, “The Usual
Suspects: Race, Police Stops and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice” (Paper Presented at the 48th
Annual Conference of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago, November, 1997); Carl E.
James, “‘Up To No Good’: Black on the Streets and Encountering Police” in Vic Satzewich, ed.,
Racism & Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance
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than members of other racial groups.127 Responding to this evidence, two
provincial appellate courts recently acknowledged the reality of racial
profiling in Canada.128
Beyond the racial profiling context, it remains difficult to gauge how
real the problem of unjustified police detentions might be on a more
general level. The law reports are simply incapable of providing a fair
representation of all cases involving police and citizen encounters. This
judicial blind spot can fairly be characterized as a form of selection bias.129
In other words, a representative sampling of all cases involving what
may arguably constitute “detentions” is not what the courts see. Although
the potential size of the problem is unknown, what is clear is the potential
toll that unjustified detentions can have on those who experience them.130
This detour to consider the potential distorting influence of selection
bias was deliberate. When one considers how far Canadian courts have
veered from Le Dain J.’s commonsensical observation about the realities of
most individual and police encounters, it is the court’s narrow vantage
point, coupled with an absence of any clear sense of the overarching
purpose of section 9, that seems to best explain the rather artificial way
in which many courts have approached their analysis of whether or not an
individual was “detained” for Charter purposes. A few examples involving
the judgments of Canadian appellate courts will serve to illustrate this point.

(Toronto: Thompson Educational Pub., 1998) 157; Robynne Neugebauer, “Kids, Cops, and Colour:
The Social Organization of Police-Minority Youth Relations” in Robynne Neugebauer, ed., Criminal
Injustice: Racism in the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000), first
page of the article; Jim Rankin et al., “Police Target Black Drivers” Toronto Star (October 20, 2002),
online: Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/
Layout/Article_PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid=1026146624189>. But see Ron Melchers, “Do Toronto
Police Engage in Racial Profiling?” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. 347 and also Scot Wortley & Julian Tanner,
“Data, Denials, and Confusion: The Racial Profiling Debate in Toronto” (2003) 45 Can. J. Crim. 367.
127
See also William J. Closs, “Bias Free Policing: The Kingston Police Data Collection
Project — A Preliminary Report to the Kingston Police Services Board” (March 17, 2005), online:
<http://www.police.kingston.on.ca/Bias%20Free%20Policing.pdf>, the most recent and, arguably,
most comprehensive Canadian study. For an excellent summary of the compelling evidence that
racial profiling is a reality in Canada, see David M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race
in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006).
128
See R. v. Brown, [2003] O.J. No. 1251, 64 O.R. (3d) 161, at paras. 7-9 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
H. (C.R.), [2003] M.J. No. 90, 173 Man. R. (2d) 113, at para. 49 (Man. C.A.).
129
On the topic of selection bias in the law reports, see generally George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation” (1984) 13 J. Legal Stud. 1.
130
For insight into the human toll of unjustified stops that are motivated by racial bias,
see Ontario Human Rights Commission, Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling
(Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003).
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Arguably, R. v. Lawrence131 represents one of the worst examples of
this strained analytical approach. In Lawrence, a police officer was
responding to a complaint from a caller who reported that a neighbour’s
home had just been broken into. As the officer approached the scene, he
saw Ms. Lawrence riding her bicycle on the sidewalk some 10 houses
away from the reported break-in. The neighbour had described the suspect
as male, and gave a detailed description of his clothing. Ms. Lawrence
was obviously not male, nor did her clothing match that of the suspect.
Nevertheless, the officer decided to intercept her. The officer did this by
pulling his police vehicle directly in front of the bicycle that Ms. Lawrence
happened to be riding at the time. This rather understandably caused
Ms. Lawrence to stop. The officer then exited his vehicle and, we are told,
“asked if he could speak to her”. The questioning was directed to where
Ms. Lawrence lived. The officer reported that he did not believe her
answers and eventually asked to look inside her knapsack. She complied
with the request and inside he found house-breaking instruments and
jewellery from the house that had been broken into. The judgment reports
that the questioning and search lasted some 25 minutes before Ms.
Lawrence was directed to sit in the police cruiser. She was arrested five
minutes after that.
Remarkably, the Court concluded that Ms. Lawrence was only detained
at the point when she was directed to sit in the police cruiser. Most
troubling is the Court’s considerable effort to de-contextualize what so
obviously seems to have been an entirely compelled encounter. The rather
tortured explanation of why the police cruiser blocking Ms. Lawrence’s
bicycle did not result in a “detention” best illustrates this shortcoming in
the Court’s analysis:
Such action certainly starts to take on the aspects of a physical detention
and brings this case closer to the line separating legitimate police
investigation from detention. However, detention involves either physical
or psychological restraint from leaving. Here there could have been
some physical inconvenience in driving the bicycle around the police
cruiser, but that would have been slight and certainly did not constitute
an impossibility.
Considering the interference with the appellant’s bicycle passage
by the cruiser, one might have concluded that there was a psychological
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detention. There was, however, no evidence that the appellant felt
compelled to remain at the police officer’s cruiser.132

(emphasis added)
On this approach, facts that objectively scream out for a finding of
“detention” are dismissed. An applicant’s failure to take the stand and
testify to the obvious — that she did not feel free to leave — becomes
controlling.
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Grafe133 provides
another unfortunate example of the same sort of reasoning. One early
evening in downtown Kitchener, Mr. Grafe was observed by the police
to be walking down the sidewalk with a second man. The attention of
the officers was drawn to the two men because they apparently kept
looking at the police cruiser, a fact that left one of the officers with the
impression that there was “something not quite kosher”. As a result, the
officers turned their police cruiser around and drove to an area on the
road adjacent to Mr. Grafe and his companion. There was conflicting
evidence as to what happened next.
On the police account, the officers exited their vehicle and approached
the two men, at which point Grafe and his companion were asked to
identify themselves. Both men complied and were permitted to go on
their way. In contrast, Mr. Grafe testified that neither officer ever exited
the police cruiser. Rather, he claimed that he had been walking on the
sidewalk when the officers stopped their vehicle, rolled down the window
and summoned them over by saying: “Yous guys, would you please come
over here.” Mr. Grafe was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant,
so he gave the police a false name. The police subsequently discovered
his true identity and he was eventually charged with impersonation.
On these facts, the trial judge found that Mr. Grafe felt sufficiently
compelled by the police request that he was “detained” by the time he
was asked to identify himself. The failure to apprise him of his right to
counsel was found to have violated section 10(b), resulting in the exclusion
of the evidence and his acquittal. In allowing the Crown appeal, the Ontario
Court of Appeal viewed the circumstances rather differently.
… the evidence does not support a finding that the respondent reasonably
believed that he was detained. His conversation with the police occurred
on the sidewalk of a downtown city street in daylight. The respondent
132
133

R. v. Lawrence, [1990] O.J. No. 1648, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 55 (Ont. C.A.).
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was not required to sit in the back seat of the cruiser. On the respondent’s
own evidence the police officers treated him politely and used language
of courtesy. The discussion was of short duration and the respondent
left when it ended. The police officers could do nothing if the respondent
had refused to talk to them because, again in Constable Kalan’s words,
“I had nothing to . . . Nothing I could hold them with or detain them on.”
In the light of the reasoning and result in R. v. Moran, supra, where
the inconvenience to the accused was considerably greater than that
experienced by the respondent, it is impossible to characterize the
respondent’s condition during the conversation as one of detention.
The Charter does not seek to insulate all members of society from
all contact with constituted authority, no matter how trivial the contact
may be. When one considers the full range of contacts in modern society
between state and citizen that which took place between the respondent
and Constables Kalan and Waite on the first occasion cannot be
characterized otherwise than as innocuous. Its occurrence was not an
invasion of any of the respondent’s Charter rights. Accordingly, the
evidence should not have been excluded.134

What this analysis seems to ignore is the rather obvious point that if
Mr. Grafe did not feel compelled to come to the police cruiser and answer
the questions posed, then why would he have proceeded to provide the
police with a false name? Most reasonable people, placed in the very
position of Mr. Grafe, would feel obligated to attend at the window of
the police cruiser and identify themselves if instructed to do so by a
uniformed police officer in a marked cruiser. This is so, regardless of
how politely a police officer later claims she was when making the
“request”. For most members of the public, such a “request” will be
quite reasonably perceived as a “direction” of the kind that no one, other
than a seasoned defence lawyer, might reasonably think they have the
option to refuse.
A more recent example is provided by the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
judgment in R. v. B. (L.).135 In B. (L.), the police were driving past a high
school when they observed L.B., along with a second youth, apparently
engaging in a conversation with one another, even though both young
men were physically separated by a considerable distance, with one
located at the top of a hill and the other near the bottom. This struck the
officers as suspicious, so they turned their police cruiser around and
returned to the location in order to investigate. L.B. did not testify on the
134
135

R. v. Grafe, [1987] O.J. No. 796, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 267, at 274 (Ont. C.A.).
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Charter application. The police officers did. They gave evidence that
soon after they exited their vehicle, L.B. descended from the top of the
hill and intercepted them. The police officers claimed that they proceeded
to strike up a casual conversation with the two young men, that culminated
in both being asked for their names and dates of birth. Each complied,
and their particulars were then passed along by radio to be cross-checked
with the Canadian Police Information Computer (CPIC) database. While
waiting for the results, one of the officers located a knapsack that L.B.
had been carrying when police first observed him. Neither young man
claimed ownership of the bag. The officer therefore decided to treat the
knapsack as abandoned and proceeded to search it. Inside, the officer found
a loaded handgun. Both young men were then immediately arrested at
gunpoint.
In reversing the trial judge’s finding that L.B. had been detained
“when he was asked for identification and waited for the results of the
CPIC search”,136 the Court of Appeal relied on Grafe,137 and a handful of
subsequent judgments,138 that have read that decision as rejecting the
notion that such requests result in a Charter “detention”.139 Beyond this,
however, the Court never deals directly with the implications of the request
for names and identification made in this case, which involved two
police officers interacting with a couple of 15-year-old boys. Instead, in
reversing the trial judge’s ruling, the Court indicated:
I do not suggest that the respondent did not feel some stress in the
situation. No doubt, he felt somewhat intimidated by the police given
the obvious power imbalance that existed. He may also have felt some
anxiety by reason of the positioning of the police car, the fact that both
officers got out of the car and the manner in which Officer Reimer
attempted to prevent him and F from communicating with each other.
The trial judge quite properly took those factors into account in assessing
the issue of detention. But respectfully, he went wrong on the legal test.
In my view, had he applied the correct legal test to the uncontradicted
evidence of the officers and placed the onus on the respondent, where
it belonged, he would have found that psychological compulsion had
not been made out, at least not on a balance of probabilities. In the
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R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 2007 ONCA 596, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
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See R. v. Hall, [1995] O.J. No. 544, 22 O.R. (3d) 289, at paras. 21-23 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
H. (C.R.), [2003] M.J. No. 90, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 67, at paras. 33-36 (Man. C.A.).
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See R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 2007 ONCA 596, at paras. 47-55 (Ont. C.A.).
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circumstances, evidence from the respondent was a virtual must, and it
was not forthcoming.140

Decisions like Lawrence,141 Grafe142 and B. (L.)143 are difficult to
reconcile with the realities of how most people would reasonably perceive
inquisitorial questioning by police officers. Not surprisingly, none of
these cases reproduce the key passages from Therens,144 wherein Le
Dain J. recognizes the obvious but important point that: “Most citizens
are not aware of the precise legal limits of police authority. Rather than risk
the application of physical force or prosecution for wilful obstruction,
the reasonable person is likely to err on the side of caution, assume
lawful authority and comply with the demand.”145 Over the last 20 years
the cases seem to have drifted away from this realistic view of how most
reasonable individuals will experience police requests.
In partial defence of the Ontario Court of Appeal in B. (L.),146 as of
late the Supreme Court itself has seemed to signal that the time to revisit
the meaning of “detention” may have arrived. No doubt anticipating the
impracticality of requiring full compliance with the right to counsel
found in section 10(b) during investigative detentions, the Supreme Court
in Mann147 suggested that “the police cannot be said to ‘detain’, within
the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, every suspect they stop for
purposes of identification, or even interview.”148 Of course, these comments
are difficult to square with the Court’s prior decisions that set a relatively
low bar for “detention”, cases like Therens149 in which rather brief and
comparatively unobtrusive stops of motorists qualified.150
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that an applicant’s failure to
testify that she felt compelled to remain should not be important. In
marginal cases, where the objective indicators of “detention” are weak,
the applicant’s failure to testify can quite justifiably provide the decisive
140
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143
R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 2007 ONCA 596 (Ont. C.A.).
144
R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.).
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factor against finding that there has been a “detention”.151 The difficulty
is with cases like Lawrence152 and B. (L.),153 where an applicant’s failure
to testify seems like little more than an excuse for not characterizing an
encounter as compelled that objectively screams out for a finding of
“detention”. Take B. (L.) for example. In all seriousness, can it fairly be
claimed that two teenage boys who are approached by police after a
police vehicle is spun around and driven toward them for the very
purpose of intercepting them for questioning, physically separated by
police, asked to account for their presence in a particular location, asked
to identify themselves and subjected to a CPIC check, would feel entitled
to walk away before the police inform them that they are free to do so?
I do not mean to argue that every time a police officer interacts with
a member of the public, a section 9 “detention” results. Encounters
between individuals and the police are rich in their diversity. Most such
experiences are relatively benign, usually involving nothing more than
conversation. Such exchanges can become more invasive, however, as
conversation turns to questioning that increasingly resembles interrogation.
Coercion can replace consent if a police officer assumes control over
an individual’s movements through either physical or psychological
compulsion. In assessing whether an individual has been detained from
a psychological standpoint, the language used by a police officer will
usually provide the most obvious clue. If an officer directs an individual
to “stop” or to “come here” or to even “please come here”, and the target
of such a demand or direction obeys, the fact that there has been a
“detention” seems plainly obvious.
At the same time, it is also important to recognize that a great many
coercive encounters between the police and members of the public are
far subtler, but nevertheless just as compelled. Beyond the legal powers
that accompany a police officer’s status, there are also the physical signs
of his or her authority, the uniform, the baton and the gun. With very
little effort, a police officer can use these symbols of authority to create
an atmosphere of compulsion without ever making any overt “demand”
or issuing an express “direction”. A police officer’s tone of voice, body
language and physical positioning can communicate to an individual
that he or she is not free to leave just as effectively as any authoritative
151
See, e.g., R. v. Esposito, [1985] O.J. No. 1002, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88, at 101 (Ont. C.A.),
leave to appeal refused [1986] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Lawrence, [1990] O.J. No. 1648, 59 C.C.C. (3d) 55 (Ont. C.A.).
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R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 2007 ONCA 596 (Ont. C.A.).
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command or direction. In other words, a police officer’s “direction” can
come in the form of a stern look and a raised finger that would make
plain, both to the subject and anyone who happens to be watching, that
non-compliance is simply not an option.
No doubt, there is much deliberate ambiguity that marks a great many
police and citizen interactions. Leaving an individual’s legal status less
than clear works to the benefit of the police, who are able to advance their
inquiries relatively free from concern that their actions will subsequently
be characterized as resulting in a “detention” and therefore run afoul of
section 9 should a court later conclude that they lacked the legal grounds
to detain at the time. Avoiding a “detention” also brings with it the added
benefit of not engaging the informational duties created by subsections
10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter. For example, an individual who is told in
express terms why he or she is being detained may very well decide to
stop talking, thereby scuttling police efforts to quickly get to the bottom
of things.
Our current approach in deciding whether or not a police-citizen
encounter is sufficiently coercive to constitute a “detention” leaves the
police much room to navigate their difficult responsibilities. It must be
frankly acknowledged, however, that at the same time it does very little
to protect individuals from unjustified state interferences with their liberty.
The purpose of section 9 seems conspicuously absent from the analytical
approach currently employed by Canadian courts in deciding whether or
not an individual was “detained”.
If protecting individuals from unjustified state intrusions on freedom of
movement is our actual goal, an approach that openly acknowledges and
accounts for the profound power disparity that exists between the police
and most individuals seems far more appropriate.
When an individual remains in the presence of the police while
questions are being posed, he or she should be truly choosing to do so.
Allowing such encounters to remain steeped in uncertainty may do a
great deal to facilitate the important functions of law enforcement, but
does very little to ensure that such encounters are truly voluntary.
In the context of search and seizure, our courts have demonstrated a
clear reluctance to characterize an individual’s acquiescence to police
authority as truly “consensual” unless the individual said to be consenting
is aware of the right to refuse and is also aware of the potential
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consequences of giving up the right.154 This high standard for waiver
does not necessarily impose an informational duty on law enforcement.
It does mean, however, that factual ambiguity surrounding the
circumstances of a “consent” search will often mean that the waiver of
the right will be considered wanting. As a result, if the police wish to
ensure that “consent” is subsequently determined to be valid they will
take the time to inform the target of his or her right to refuse.
In stark contrast, ambiguity about an individual’s right to walk away
has tended to weigh against a finding of “detention”. If a purposive
reading of section 9 is what the Charter actually requires, 155 then a
different approach to evaluating whether or not an encounter between an
individual and the police qualifies as a “detention” seems in order. If we
truly want to protect individuals from unjustified state interferences with
their liberty, then the police should be expected to make clear to
individuals the true nature of their interactions.
I do not mean to suggest that police officers should be required to
preface every interaction with members of the public with a formal legal
caution, for example, by explaining that “it is my duty to inform you
that you have the right to walk away”. Nevertheless, police officers
should be expected to use language that makes clear to those with whom
they are interacting when an interaction is in fact voluntary. If a police
officer fails to use permissive language that would make apparent the
option to refuse156 or says nothing at all, then the subject’s acquiescence
should be characterized for what it most probably is: compelled, a
“detention” for Charter purposes.

IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Charter has led to many positive changes within the
Canadian criminal justice system, section 9 has so far proven to be an
unfortunate exception. The key concepts that are central to the protection
154
See R. v. Borden, [1994] S.C.J. No. 82, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, at 161 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at 624 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wills, [1992] O.J.
No. 294, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 529, at 541 (Ont. C.A.).
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See notes 53 to 55 and accompanying text.
156
To provide some concrete examples of what I have in mind, language like: “excuse me,
would you mind coming over here” or “would it be alright if I had a word with you”, or “it would
really assist me if I could ask you some questions, would you be willing to answer them?” would
all seem sufficient to bring home to the individual involved that his or her cooperation is being
requested and not required.
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afforded by this constitutional guarantee, the meaning of “detention”
and “arbitrarily” have both been steeped in considerable confusion.
The source of that confusion would seem to be the absence of a
seminal judgment interpreting the guarantee from our Supreme Court.
Because of this, the purpose of section 9 has never consciously formed a
part of how the guarantee has been read. The result has been a rather
legalistic approach, with lower courts interpreting and applying its two
key terms (“detention” and “arbitrarily”) in an extraordinarily narrow and
restrictive fashion.
A purposive approach to the interpretation of the guarantee reveals
that its object is relatively straightforward: protecting the individual
from unjustified state interference with his or her liberty. Realizing the
potential of section 9 depends on revisiting how its key terms are read in
light of that overarching objective.
First, a purposive reading of “arbitrarily” would seem to dictate that
any unlawful interference with individual liberty should be considered
arbitrary and a violation of section 9. To the extent that this might result
in violations of section 9 based on minor or technical breaches of the law,
the appropriate place to deal with such mitigating circumstances would
seem to be section 24(2). The time has come to recognize that under our
constitutional system, legal authority is an essential precondition for any
interference with individual liberty. The flipside of this long-standing
constitutional requirement is that when liberty is interfered with in the
absence of legal authority, the detention that results is necessarily
unconstitutional.
In addition, we must also begin to recognize that the important
purpose of section 9 is not served when uncertainty about an individual’s
status is allowed to control the constitutional outcome. If we are going
to take seriously the right to be free from unjustified state interference with
our liberty, then we must begin to insist on greater clarity in encounters
between citizens and police. Ambiguous encounters should be labelled just
as Justice Le Dain suggested, for what they most likely are, “detentions”.

